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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 101 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 18/06/1997 
Where it occurred: Darwaz village, Anar 
Darah District, Farah 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 12/02/2004 Date  last modified: 12/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inconsistent statements (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for better PPE (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for five years. It was two months since his last revision course 
and 24 days since his last leave. The area where the accident occurred was described as 
grazing land on a hillside. A photograph showed it was not steep but was littered with large 
rocks.  
The investigators determined that the victim thought a detector reading was a fragment and 
was careless when prodding. The mine was identified as a PMN (from "found 
fragments/pieces"). The victim's bayonet was "lost" and his helmet damaged. 
The Team Leader stated that the victim was doing his job properly. 
The Section Leader said that the victim was working properly and he believed the orientation 
of the mine in the ground had been changed – making it hard to prevent such accidents. He 
said the deminers should be provided with "anti-fragmentation" jackets. 
The victim's partner said that the victim was prodding and working properly. 
The victim said that he thought the signal was a fragment (he had found many before) and 
prodded carelessly. He said he should have been prodding prone and that all deminers 
should do so. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim made a "wrong judgement" over the detector 
reading, ignored safe prodding procedures by squatting and ignored proper marking 
procedures. The Section Leader showed poor command and control. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that every reading should be treated as a mine and properly 
marked before starting to investigate. Also that the Section Leader should be disciplined for 
poor performance by allowing the deminer to work squatting and not to mark properly. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 134 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: 25,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Helmet 
 









See medical report. 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as superficial injuries to his left arm and shoulder. A 
medic's report recorded superficial injury to both arms and left "foreleg".  
A sketch showed injuries mirrored front to back (a mistake unless every fragment went 
through) and recorded fragments and lacerations to the lower face, both upper arms, the right 
thigh, both shins and the right hand.  
The victim's partner recorded injury to the victims nose. A photograph showed a lacerated 
nose and severely lacerated left shin. 
The demining group reported that the victim sustained multiple superficial injuries to his right 
thigh, both legs below knee, right hand, right arm and shoulder, left arm and shoulder and 
face. The insurers were informed on 20th May 1997 that the victim had sustained fragment 
injuries to both arms and his left shin.  
Compensation of 25,000 Rs was forwarded on 28th October 1997. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because his facial 
injuries indicate that his visor was raised and this error went uncorrected by field controllers.  
The victim's failure to use the visor may have been due to the poor condition of the thin visors 
used (inspected frequently by the researcher and usually found impossible to see through 
adequately). The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing.   
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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